Post by sobriquetDoes he have a point?
http://youtu.be/YhN4X56E7iM
|
| I think currently what we've done is
| we've managed to insulate ourselves from
| mathematical reality.
| And for me, that means
| being in touch with computation.
| I don't want mathematics to be
| an exercise in philosophy.
I consider
the verification of the validity of a proof to be
a computation.
I think that makes all or nearly.all of
what Wildberger considers problematic
what Wildberger sees going from strength to strength.
Am I outside the mainstream of thought on that?
My philosophy of mathematics,
boiled down to its essentials:
A claim is one of true or false.
In a finite sequence of claims,
if each claim is not.first.false,
then each claim is not.false.
A claim in a sequence might be externally verified
to be not.false (and thus, not.first.false)
by definitions, by axioms, by theorems
external to that finite sequence of claims.
A claim in a sequence might be internally verified
to be not.first.false.
Famously, Q in ⟨P P⇒Q Q⟩ is an example of this.
Is Q true? What does Q even mean?
Such questions don't matter.
Q is not.first false in ⟨P P⇒Q Q⟩
If Q is in a finite only.not.first.false sequence
then Q is true.
And I still don't know what Q means.
If
we see in front of us
a finite sequences of claims which is
only.not.first.false about each one of infinitely.many
then
each claim in that sequence is
true of each one of infinitely.many,
even the claims that are only internally verified
(the interesting claims, learned from that sequence).
We have not laid hands on each one of infinitely.many,
so I'm guessing Wildberger is troubled by my philosophy,
but we have "laid hands on" _each claim_
My philosophy is that logic about
differentiable manifolds or inaccessible cardinals
is primarily logic about finite sequences of claims.
And _the claims_ are accessible to finite beings.
There are many claims in physics about which
it would be perfectly reasonable to ask
how could we _possibly_ know that?
I think that my philosophy (hands.on claims)
answers that question.
A favorite example of mine is the size of
the cosmos, outside our observable universe
Starting from the assumption that
there is nothing unusual about our speck of dust,
we measure the (observable) curvature of the universe
and extrapolate outside the observable.
That method requires us to reason about
that which we cannot, even in principle, observe.
How can we possibly know that?
My answer is:
by assembling finite only.not.first.false
sequences of claims, which we can observe.
Post by sobriquetI think he's right that
AI is about to take math to a higher level
beyond what we can comprehend
from our current point of view
that is most likely misguided and
full of historical misconceptions.
I don't know. We'll have to see whether
the offspring of our minds slip free of our history.
Each generation of human children,
offspring of our minds and bodies,
struggle to slip free of their parents' history.
Each generation succeeds some and fails some,
I think.
If we don't build into our AI an ability to slip free
of history at least as well as human children,
then I think the AI mathpocalypse won't come,
but I also think that, if we don't do that,
this whole AI thing going on will be found
to be not worth the effort put into it,
and will eventually be thought a passing fad.